What your clipboard knows about you

Any app you run can read your Mac's clipboard without asking. What that means, and what to check before installing a clipboard manager.

The macOS pasteboard is shared. Every app you have running can read it, at any time, without a prompt and without leaving a trace. That is not a vulnerability — it is how copy and paste works between apps — but it has a consequence most people have never thought about.

Your clipboard sees your worst secrets

Think about what has gone through yours this week. A password out of a password manager. A two-factor code. A card number. A private address. A link to a document that should not be public. All of it sat on a shared system service that any running process could have read.

iOS made this visible in 2020: iOS 14 started showing a banner whenever an app read the pasteboard, and the results embarrassed a lot of well-known apps. macOS shows no such banner. The same reads are happening; you just cannot see them.

What macOS does to limit it

  • The pasteboard does not survive a restart. Reboot and it is empty.
  • Secure input prevents some password fields from being captured at all.
  • Apps can mark what they put on the pasteboard as concealed or transient, which is a signal to anything watching that it must not be stored.

That last one matters more than it sounds, and it is the single most important thing to check about a clipboard manager.

Concealed items, and why password managers rely on them

When 1Password, Bitwarden or Apple Passwords copies a password, it marks the pasteboard item as concealed — technically org.nspasteboard.ConcealedType. It is a convention, not an enforced rule: nothing stops an app ignoring it.

A clipboard manager that ignores it will write every password you copy into a permanent, searchable list. That is a genuinely bad outcome, and it is the default behaviour of more clipboard tools than you would like.

Before you install any clipboard manager, search its documentation for "concealed" or "password manager". If it does not mention honouring the marker, assume it does not.

The four questions to ask

  1. Does it skip concealed items? If not, it is a password log.
  2. Is the stored history encrypted on disk? A plain-text database in Application Support is readable by anything running as you.
  3. Does anything leave the machine? Cloud sync is a real feature with a real cost: your clipboard history now exists on someone else's server. Decide deliberately.
  4. Can you exclude apps and pause it? You will want to, before typing into your bank.

How Pastelo answers them

We built Pastelo around those four, so here are our answers plainly:

  • Items marked concealed or transient are skipped and never written to disk. Tested against 1Password, Bitwarden and Apple Passwords.
  • History is encrypted with AES-GCM, and the key lives in your macOS Keychain rather than next to the data.
  • No clipboard content is sent anywhere — not to us, not to any analytics service. There is no clipboard sync, which is a deliberate omission rather than a missing feature.
  • You can exclude apps, pause for fifteen minutes or until you resume, delete any item, and clear everything.

Direct paste needs macOS Accessibility permission, because putting keystrokes into another app requires it. If you would rather not grant that, leave it off: Pastelo copies the item instead and you press ⌘V yourself. Everything else works exactly the same.

In short

  • Any app on your Mac can read your clipboard silently, and macOS will not tell you.
  • Password managers mark copied secrets as concealed; honouring that marker is the bar a clipboard manager has to clear.
  • Encryption at rest, no network, and an exclusion list are the rest of the bar.

Our full privacy policy and the support pages go into more detail.